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Abstract
We construct a staged development framework with multi-period discrete choices to
study the colonization of Hong Kong, which facilitated the trade of several agricultural
and manufactured products, including opium, between Britain and China. The model
is particularly designed based on historical data and documentation collected from
various sources. We show theoretically how institutions changed in response to the
underlying key primitives and lead to the transition from the pre-Opium War era, to
the post-Opium War era and then to the post-opium trade era, which span the period
1773-1933. Finally, we support our theoretical ndings with historical evidence.
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1 Introduction
\Attempting to understand economic, political, and social change ... re-
quires a fundamental recasting of the way we think. Can we develop a
dynamic theory comparable in elegance to general equilibrium theory? The
answer is probably not. But if we can achieve an understanding of the
underlying process of change then we can develop somewhat more limited
hypotheses about change that can enormously improve the usefulness of so-
cial science theory in confronting human problems" (North 2006, p. vii).
Hong Kong, known as the \Pearl of the Orient," came on the platform of the global
economy towards the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when it grew as a
key entrepot for the Britain-China trade. Since then, it has become, together with
Shanghai, one of the two most important economic centers that bridge the East with
the West. Although Hong Kong was just one of the English-speaking colonies (see
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), it played a unique and distinctive role in
facilitating the Britain-China trade. Also, in contrast with many other colonies that
experienced a relative stagnation, Hong Kong was transformed into one of the four
rapidly growing Asian Tigers and soon after joined the league of developed economies.
In spite of its rich economic history, the miraculous development of Hong Kong
that unfolded over the past two or three centuries remains largely unexplored. This
paper attempts to narrow the gap by highlighting the role played by Hong Kong, prior
to World War II (WWII), as the pearl of the Britain-China trade. It was this role that
helped pave Hong Kong's path of phenomenal development, making it one of the most
successful countries in the world.1
To study this trade-induced colonization, it is most relevant to understand the
historical development of Hong Kong between the years 1709, when Britain authorized
the East India Company (EIC) to organize its trade with China, and 1941, when
Japan occupied Hong Kong. In our paper, however, we start with 1773, when ocial
recording of opium trade began, and end with 1933, because consistent trade data are
available only until this year. We divide the chronicle of this historical time span in
three distinct subperiods.
1Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a) remark that, among Western European countries, At-
lantic traders grew much faster and in a more sustainable manner than nontraders. In this regard, the
colonization of Hong Kong was also signicant in contributing to British development.
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(i) The pre-OpiumWar era (1773-1839): with EIC essentially monopolizing the Britain-
China bilateral trade throughout almost the entire subperiod and with the British
government valuing both the volume of trade and the induced net silver ow,
opium trade became gradually so important that eventually turned the British
trade decit into a surplus. Moreover, during this subperiod we observe an up-
ward trend in both the quantity and the price of opium.
(ii) The post-Opium War era (1861-1917): after the Opium Wars and the colonization
of Hong Kong (1840-1860), opium trade became legal.2 The share of opium in
British exports to China rose sharply over the next three decades following the
last war, subsequently decreased gradually over the period 1892-1906 and nally
dropped to zero a few years after the establishment of the Republic of China,
which formally took place in 1912.
(iii) The post-opium trade era (1918-1933): with all parts of the opium complex being
regulated, the bilateral trade between Britain and China gradually diminished;
nevertheless, Hong Kong continued to play its signicant role as the pearl of the
Britain-Orient commerce.
We shall refer to these three subperiods as Phase I, II and III, respectively.
There is no doubt that a thorough study of the colonization process of Hong Kong
is interesting. Yet, the big question is whether it is possible to develop a dynamic
theory that endogenizes the institution and takes into account economic, political and
social changes in this historic event. Despite North's pessimism about such an en-
deavor (see North 2006 and the quote before the Introduction), the political economy
frameworks for endogenous institutions constructed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000,
2001, 2008), Dewatripont and Roland (1992) and Lagerlof (2009) have convincingly
shown the feasibility of meeting this challenge (see also the survey by Acemoglu, John-
son and Robinson, 2005b). Methodologically, our paper contributes to the literature
by proposing a staged development framework with multi-period discrete choices to
endogenize institutions in a tractable manner.
To be more specic, we construct a dynamic model with the staged development
of the colonization of Hong Kong captured in the aforementioned three phases. Based
2The colonization of Hong Kong and the legalization of opium trade were among the provisions of
the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the Treaty of Tiensin (1858) and the Convention of Peking (1860) (see
below).
2
on the economic data collected from limited sources and many historical documents,
we design a model with the following key features:
(i) In addition to a composite good, we explicitly model opium production and trade.
(ii) We regard the British government and EIC as the two main organizations in
action and permit the institutions to change over the three phases. The major
institutions considered include the barriers that Britain faced in trading opium,
the British government's subsidy rule to EIC, the declaration of wars and the
decision on banning opium trade after the founding of the Republic of China.3
(iii) We allow the British government to value both the volume of trade with China
and the resultant net silver inow. Moreover, we take into account both the
resource cost involved in the war and the moral cost associated with trading
opium.
(iv) Given the addictive nature of opium, we model its demand as not too sensitive
to its relative price. Also, given the observed comovement between the quantity
and the relative price of opium, we allow for the presence of an opium demand
shock.
(v) Finally, given the evolutionary nature of history, we solve a multi-period discrete
choice problem and characterize the transition from Phase I (the pre-Opium
War era), to Phase II (the post-Opium War era), and then to Phase III (the
post-opium trade era).
For theoretical tractability, the declaration of wars and the decision on banning opium
trade are both modeled as discrete choices, through which the endogenous transition
from one phase to another can be fully characterized.
Our main ndings concerning the colonization of Hong Kong are three-fold. First,
due to high warfare and low opium trading costs initially, Phase I lasted for a long
period of almost 70 years (1773-1839). Second, due to high valuation of the total
volume of trade, high opium trading costs and the expectation of a continuously rising
opium demand, the war was declared. This led to the transition to Phase II, during
which the Hong Kong colony was established and opium trade became legal. Finally,
due to a signicant drop in opium demand and a rising opium trading cost, opium
3Following North (1994), we regard \organizations" as the players who are made up of groups of
individuals with common objective and \institutions" as the rules of the game.
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trade was abandoned, causing the transition to the post-opium trade era (Phase III).
In the remainder of the paper, we shall elaborate on these underlying factors driving
the two critical transitions by verifying them theoretically, using comparative-static
analysis, and supporting the various channels with historical data and documents.
2 Historical Background
In this section, we provide a brief chronicle of the historical development of Hong Kong
from 1773 to 1933. We then highlight three important observations that will guide the
design of our model.
2.1 A Chronicle of the Development of Hong Kong
While there has been a long history of exchange between Britain and China, the high
volume and more organized form of trade between these two giants started after the
turn of the seventeenth century. Established in 1600 and merged with a new \parallel"
company in 1709, EIC served as \a means of regulating international trade" (Gull
1943, p. 3).4 The EIC era was terminated in 1833. Soon after, in 1840, there was the
outbreak of the rst Opium War. After erce military and political ghts that lasted
for two decades, the post-treaty period began; from 1860 and onward, opium trade was
fully legalized until 1917, that is, several years into the Republic of China era, which
formally began on January 1, 1912.5
The Pre-Opium War Era: 1773-1839
The British involvement, through EIC, in the trade of opium started in Canton
in 1773 and is estimated at 1000 chests per year (Gull 1943, p. 13).6 Throughout
this era, both the shipments and price of opium rose. However, while the price of
opium went up only by 70 percent, the shipments of opium increased drastically by
forty times. More specically, between 1811 and 1835, the annual average number of
chests of opium exported to China rose more than three times indicating that opium
4Both James Mill and John Stuart Mill worked for EIC and eventually both became head of the
oce at East India House in London.
5Opium imports from India (a British colony at the time) came to an end by 1917 under the
agreement of the British and Chinese governments. Historians often relate this date to the year after
the death of the President of the Republic of China, Shikai Yuan, in 1916.
6Details on all units of measurement are given in the Appendix.
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trade had become relatively more signicant over time (see Chart 1).7 For example,
based on the record of EIC in 1828, opium accounted for more than 55% of the total
export value to China. In addition, in ten-years' time, from 1828 to 1838, the opium
shipments to China rose by threefold, from 13,868 to 40,200 chests.
The Opium Wars and the Treaties: 1840-1860
The rst Opium War formally began on June 9, 1840. Nevertheless, even before
that day, it was well recognized by British merchants that a settlement of their own was
needed to establish themselves \under the British ag, besides safe and unrestricted
liberty of trade at the principal marts of the Empire" (Tuck 2000, vol. 9, p. 212). In
fact, for the British the Opium War was beyond opium trade. It was for \the future
mode of conducting the foreign trade in China" (Tuck 2000, vol. 9, p. 212).
The rst Opium War lasted for more than two years and led to the Treaty of
Nanking, which was signed on August 29, 1842. Among others, the treaty stipulated
that (i) Hong Kong should become a British colony; (ii) Cohong (the Chinese coun-
terpart of EIC) was to be abolished; (iii) ve coastal cities, namely, Amoy, Canton,
Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, were to open as Treaty Ports; and, (iv) there should
be a decrease from 65% to 5% in the rates of duty on major trade items, such as silk,
cotton, and woollens (but not tea); opium was not mentioned (Tuck 2000, vol. 9, p.
214).
The Treaty of Nanking changed the framework of foreign trade and gave Britain
a most-favored-nation status.8 Naturally, after the treaty, there was still a strong
resentment against foreigners in Canton. As a result, the terms of the treaty were
not respected and the hostility between the Chinese and the British started growing
again. Eventually this led to the outbreak of the second Opium War in October 1856,
which ended with the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858.9 According to the terms of this
treaty: (i) Kowloon was ceded to Britain; (ii) ten new Treaty Ports opened; and most
importantly, (iii) opium trade was legalized (Nield 2010, pp. 130-132).
The two decades of the Opium Wars dened a transitional stage, which started
7According to Gull (1943), \Between 1811 and 1821 the annual average of chests imported ... was
under 5,000." Also, "[B]etween 1828 and 1835 the annual average import was over 18,700" (p. 15).
8The previous system, known as the Canton System because it required that all foreign trade be
conducted through the port of Canton, had been in force since 1760.
9The second Opium War was a joint eort of Britain and France; the French joined the British
troops with the excuse that one of their missionaries was killed in Canton. Also, the Treaty of Tientsin
was ratied by Emperor Hsien-Feng in the Convention of Peking in 1860.
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with the prohibition of opium trade and ended with its full legalization. In the interest
of this paper, we will not discuss this era in our model; instead, we will regard it simply
as a transition point.
The Post-Opium War Era: 1861-1917
With the Treaty of Tientsin (1858) and the Convention of Peking (1860), opium
trade was legalized; consequently, opium imported to China reached a high level both
in absolute quantity and as a share of total imports (40%-50%) in the two decades
following the Opium Wars. Starting in the mid-1880s, it gradually began to drop and
eventually was reduced to zero a few years after the establishment of the Republic of
China (see Chart 2).10 Nevertheless, the price of opium was quite stable for most of
the period, both in absolute and in relative (to rice) terms.
The Britain-China trade diminished by the end of the nineteenth century due to
the fact that trade of opium declined. One of the main reasons for this decline is that
the legalization of opium trade led to a rapid increase in the domestic production of
opium in China. This Chinese production started in the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou,
and Sichuan, which together contributed over 60% of the total domestic production of
opium. Between 1866 and 1894, the total area of plantation of opium, as a percentage
of the total agricultural area, rose by more than seven times, from 0.2% to 1.5%. The
table below presents the consumption and production of opium between 1879 and 1906
(the data are from Zhong (2010) and the units of measurement are piculs { see the
Appendix for the denition).
Item 1879 1906
domestic production 334,300 587,300
import 82,927 54,117
consumption 417,227 641,417
self-support rate 80.12% 91.56%
import rate 19.88% 8.44%
It indicates that, over the years, imported opium was replaced by domestic production
(see also the discussion in Zhong 2010, p. 148). Further evidence can be established
using the customs and dues (known as likin) collected from opium. Specically, while
10Because of dierent measurement units, the pre- and post-Opium War data series are not directly
comparable. That is why we present each subperiod separately.
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the likin collected from imported opium fell from more than 6.5 to less than 3.5 million
taels over the period of 1888-1909, the likin from domestic opium rose from below 1 to
over 1.5 million taels, thus indicating a signicant shift from imported to domestically
produced opium.11
The decline of imported opium can be attributed to two reasons: (i) the interna-
tional opposition to opium trade based on moral judgement and value (see \The Moral
Cost of Opium Trade," in Subsection 2.2) and (ii) the Britain's reduced incentives for
promoting opium exports to China, since exporting opium was no longer necessary for
ensuring British tea imports from China. Not only did British tea imports from China
drop from 96% to 10% between 1866 and 1903, as tea was then produced in India and
Ceylon, but also the openings of the Treaty Ports after the Opium Wars led to the
increase in the consumption of western products (such as clocks, watches, matches,
lamps, etc.) by the Chinese.
As a colony of the United Kingdom, Hong Kong acted as an important entrepot
(Gull 1943, pp. 49-52). From 1854 to 1889, almost half of the British exports to China
passed through Hong Kong. This proportion was gradually reduced but still amounted
to about 1/3 during the period 1890-1913 (Gull 1943, p. 52). In addition, between
1865 and 1886, the imports of opium from Hong Kong exceeded the total combined
imports of opium from all other Treaty Ports. From 1880 to 1913, the proportion of
Hong Kong-China trade remained at 29%, even though the Britain-China trade, as a
proportion of China's total trade, decreased from 76% to 48%. As a result, the share
of Britain-China trade contributed by Hong Kong rose sharply from 38% in 1880 to
over 60% in 1913 (Gull 1943, p. 56). Overall, Hong Kong served as the main center in
the trade of opium between Britain and China. Nevertheless, by 1917, British opium
exports from India to China had ceased, albeit the overall Chinese consumption of
opium remained at a high level even in the twentieth century.
The Post-Opium Trade Era: 1918-1933
Although the use (and production) of opium resurfaced in China in this period, the
trade of opium between Britain and China basically disappeared from the international
arena. In the 1920-30 period, UK's exports of wool to China dropped signicantly and
were replaced by rice. Also, in 1929, China raised taris from the level of 5% that was
established in the Treaty of Nanking to a range of 7.5%-22.5% (Gull 1943, p. 115).
11It should also be noted that the likin imposed on imported opium was twice the amount imposed
on the domestically produced opium.
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Throughout this era, Britain's relative role in China's international trade declined and
the composition of the trade between them underwent through signicant structural
changes.
2.2 Three Important Observations
Based on historical documents, we would like to highlight three important observations
that will be incorporated in our theoretical framework in an attempt to understand
the colonization of Hong Kong as a crucial stage in the diachronic development of the
Britain-China trade.
The British Objective
As documented in the preface and various chapters of Gull (1943), China was
regarded by the British government as the main target for its trade in Asia. The
ultimate goal of Britain was to facilitate such trade in a laissez faire manner. Moreover,
it was emphasized that Britain and China derived mutual benets from trade; thus, it
seems that there was value put to both exports and imports (see, for example, Tuck
2000, vol. 2, Appendix G). Put dierently, the motive of the British colonization was
to do business: \there is little doubt that the spirit of commercial enterprise was the
leading motive of the British colonial policy, and it was the British pursuit of trade in
the East, which brought China and Britain into confrontation" (Bard 2000, p. 7).
To illustrate the long-run trend and characteristics of the Britain-China trade vol-
ume, we must construct the real trade series based on limited data from various sources.
For the period before the nineteenth century, there are no general price level data avail-
able. Instead, we are able to compute the prices of opium and tea in various years
between 1761 and 1800. Opium and tea were, respectively, the most important ex-
port and import items of Britain during this period. To obtain real trade statistics, we
therefore deate the data of total British exports and imports to and from China using
the computed prices. These are exhibited in Chart 3. We can see that real imports and
exports increased prominently, especially after 1785.12 In fact, this motivated Britain
to pay more attention to its commercial relations with China. For the post-Opium War
period, we are able to obtain both the Sauerbeck-Statist's overall price index (Mitchell
1988) and the individual prices of tradables. Chart 4 presents the results we obtained
12Recall that opium trade started being ocially recorded in 1773. This highlights the prominent
role played by opium in the development of the Britain-China trade around this year.
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using the overall price index.13 Again, this chart points to the important fact that
total real trade between Britain and China rose over time during the post-Opium War
period.
With regard to the composition of the Britain-China trade in the pre-Opium War
period and especially before 1800, tea and silk were the two major British import
items from China; they accounted for more than 70% of the total British imports from
China. On the export side, there were three major items, wool, cotton and opium;
these accounted for more than 80% of the total British exports to China. An important
feature is that the share of opium in exports rose sharply over time from around 11%
in 1773 to over 49% in 1833, while the export share of woollen products fell drastically
from 41% to 10% over the same period. In the rst two decades of the post-Opium War
period, tea and silk continued to be the two major British import items, accounting
together for about 80% of total imports. However, this pattern changed after the turn
of the twentieth century. For example, in the 1920s these two items accounted for
around a quarter of the total British imports. This was mainly due to the successful
policy of substituting imports from China with tea produced in India and Ceylon.
Similarly, opium was still the major export item of Britain, accounting for over 40%
of total exports, in the rst two decades of the post-Opium War period; nevertheless,
its trade was essentially eliminated after 1917.
Throughout the eighteenth century Britain suered a large and rising trade decit
in its trade with China. This decit was covered with silver purchased from continental
Europe, as Britain had been on the gold standard since the mid-eighteenth century.
Chart 5 provides more details about the British silver outows and its net export
during the pre-Opium War period. In order to stop this trade imbalance, the EIC
began to smuggle opium into China in the middle of the eighteenth century. In fact,
the traded volume of opium rose so drastically in the next few decades that the British
trade decit and the silver outows were initially mitigated and eventually reversed.
To facilitate the Britain-China trade, it was recommended \to obtain a grant of
a small tract of ground or detached Island, but in a more convenient situation than
Canton, where our present Warehouse are at a great distance from our Ships" (Tuck
2000, vol. 2, p. 237). In 1834, Lord Napier recommended Hong Kong as the base
for China trade: \if the lion's paw is to be put down on any part of the south side of
13Alternatively, we computed the aggregate export and import price indices as Cobb-Douglas aggre-
gators, using the expenditure shares as weights. Then, using these price levels, we deated the trade
statistics to obtain the corresponding real measures. The results were similar to those in Chart 4.
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China, let it be Hongkong" (Gull 1943, p. 20). In 1839, there were further discussions
about the choice of a base for the Britain-China trade. According to J. Matheson, the
cofounder of the conglomerate Jardine, Matheson & Co., \the advantage of Hongkong
would be that the more the Chinese obstructed the trade of Canton, the more they
would drive trade to the new English settlement. Moreover, Hongkong was admittedly
one of the nest harbours in the world" (Tuck 2000, vol. 9, p. 213). Indeed, as
mentioned in the previous section, these views were vindicated, since in the post-
Opium War era Hong Kong became the most important entrepot of trade between
Britain and China. In short, the British colonization of Hong Kong was mainly driven
by its geographical advantage in the promotion of trade.14
The Barrier to Opium Trade
The attitude of the Chinese ocials towards opium was consistent over time: they
regarded it as evil and unjustied. The rst Imperial edict, which prohibited the
sale and the opening of opium-smoking houses, was issued in 1729 (Rowntree 1905,
p.11-12). Despite that, there was growing consumption of opium, which raised the
awareness and concerns, regarding its devastating eects, of the Chinese high-ranking
administrators even more. In 1799, another Imperial edict prohibited the importation
of the drug (Rowntree 1905, p.12-13).15 The situation was out of control by the time
of Emperor Daoguang (1821-1850). For this reason, there was a proposal for legalizing
opium trade and turn it into public prot. However, such a proposal was rejected by
the Emperor as he replied: \It is true, I cannot prevent the introduction of the owing
poison; gain-seeking and corrupt men will for prot and sensuality, defeat my wishes;
but nothing will induce me to derive a revenue from the vice and misery of my people"
(Bard 1993, p. 30).
In September of 1836, the Imperial Government of China together with the Viceroy
of Canton started a campaign for the eradication of opium. According to William
Jardine, an opium merchant and a cofounder of Jardine, Matheson & Co., the Canton
drug market was entirely closed down by June 1837. In March 1839, Tse-hsu Lin, the
recently appointed Chinese Commissioner in Canton, ordered the immediate surrender
of all opium brought to China. The loss of opium because of this new Chinese anti-
14In a broader aspect, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) emphasize the interplay between
geography and institutional development.
15An even stricter edicts followed in 1813. Also, in 1809 the Governor of Canton \ordered all
incoming ships to be searched and for the captain of each ship to le bonds declaring that there was
no opium in the cargo. But the British ignored the order" (Nield 2010, p. 67).
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opium campaign was 20,283 chests, which was worth $2.4 million at that time (Tuck
2000, vol. 9, pp. 202-3). In response, Chief Superintendent Charles Elliot proposed to
the British government to compensate the merchants for the full value of their opium
loss. By then the British government was directly drawn in (Tuck 2000, vol. 9, pp.
203-4). In May 1839, the Chinese ocials issued an edict that commanded all the
foreigners to leave China unless they agreed to sign an opium bond \assuming full
responsibility before Chinese law for all ships consigned to their charge" (Tuck 2000,
vol. 9, p. 203). In June 1839, \Matheson and the other British merchants were
expelled from Canton for refusing to obey the orders of the Chinese Government"
(Tuck 2000, vol. 9, p. 206). After that, the diplomatic relations between Britain and
China became extremely tense. As Tuck writes, \The greater the recourse to illicit
trading from the receiving-ships at Lintin and along the coast, the greater the danger
of the Chinese Government stopping the trade ... After Lord Napier's unsuccessful
attempt to force a change, Jardine observed that the Chinese seemed more determined
than ever to maintain the system ... It was now realised even in London that no change
was possible without a show of force, which might lead to war" (Tuck 2000, vol. 9, pp.
196-7).
All the aforementioned documents highlight the fact that a barrier to opium trade
was rising over time prior to the Opium Wars. After the Opium Wars, the anti-opium
attitude of the Chinese government did not change. For example, an Imperial edict,
which was issued in 1906, forbade the sale of the drug (Hanes and Sanello 2002, p.
295). Moreover, the campaign that followed planned to eliminate opium consumption
in China within ten years.
The Moral Cost of Opium Trade
Although exporting opium to China helped Britain balance its trade decit from
tea imports quickly, this was done with reluctance, disgrace and sinfulness, which will
be referred to as the \moral cost" of opium trade. In fact, the pressure on the British
government to stop the trac of opium on moral grounds came from two dierent
sources: British ocials and citizens and other Westerners.
Several British ocials were aware of the harmful eects of opium smoking. In
fact, the British government was reluctant to initiate a war for securing opium trade:
\if it should be made a positive requisition ... that none of that drug (opium) should
be sent by us to China, you must accede to it rather than risk any essential benet by
contending for a liberty in this respect, in which case the sale of our Opium in Bengal
must be left to take its chance in an open market" (Tuck 2000, vol. 2, Appendix
11
G, Instructions to Lord Macartney, Sept. 8, 1792 by Henry Dundas, p. 239). Also,
Charles Elliot, the Chief Superintendent at Canton from 1836 to 1841, detested opium
trade: \Elliot saw it as a disgrace and a sin and the blackest stain on the British
character. It has even been suggested that Elliot, under instructions to protect the
opium traders - a task he resented - deliberately disobeyed his orders and demanded
less from the Chinese than the Government at home had ordered him to do" (Bard
2000, p. 12).
In 1840, a bill of censure that condemned the government's military action to the
opium crisis in China, which was introduced by Sir Robert Peel, the leader of the
Tory opposition, was defeated in the House of Commons by a close vote of 271 to
262.16 Later in 1857, when another bill of censure was introduced to condemn the
behavior of government ocials in the second Opium War, a coalition of Radical and
Tories (Conservatives) won the vote with 263-247, leading to the fall of Palmerston's
government (see Hanes and Sanello, 2002).
Also, after the British victory in the rst Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking,
Lord Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper (1801-1885), declared, \I cannot rejoice in
our successes; we had triumphed in one of the most lawless, unnecessary and unfair
struggles in the records of history" (Bard 2000, p. 13). Another example of a British
ocial who was fully aware of the devastating eects of opium is Lord Elgin, the British
negotiator in the Treaty of Tientsin (1858). He had \supreme power, clear instructions,
and strong backing, yet could not bring himself to tell the Chinese that the time had
come when they must legalise this lucrative, but demoralising trac" (Rowntree 1905,
p. 87). Finally, \In April 1906, a private member's motion put by Liberal MP Theodore
Taylor again condemned the opium trade as `morally indefensible' and called on the
new government to take measures to bring it to a speedy end" (Blue 2000, pp. 40-41).
There was an even stronger anti-opium sentiment in the British public opinion.
The best summary is perhaps found in Blue (2000, pp. 37-42), who writes \If before
1895 the international balance of power allowed British authorities at home and in
Asia to turn a deaf ear to protests in China, successive governments in London were
steadily subjected to denunciation by the vocal anti-opium movements in Britain and
the United States" (p. 37). Here we mention just a few examples of this opposition
16During the debate on Peel's motion, the thirty-year-old Tory MP, William Gladstone, the future
Prime Minister, delivered a powerful speech against the trade of opium. Gladstone's zealousness came
from personal acquaintance with the drug's harmul eects; his sister had been prescribed laudanum
to help her cope with a painful illness and had become addicted to it (see Hanes and Sanello, 2002).
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from other sources. An editorial in The Times on December 3, 1842, upon receiving
the news of the Treaty of Nanking wrote that \the moment had come for Britain to
extricate herself from her involvement with opium ... some moral compensation was
owed to China for pillaging her towns and slaughtering her citizens in a quarrel which
could never had arisen if we had not been guilty of an international crime" (Bard
2000, p. 12-13). Also, in England, after the Pharmacy Act of 1868, opium, along
with other drugs, could be sold only by \pharmaceutical chemists" and not without
being labeled \poison." Finally, a few years later, in November 1874, an organization,
called \The Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade," was
founded in London, having as its main purpose to make the British parliament to
outlaw the deeply immoral opium trade with China. For almost forty years (1874-
1916), this organization waged an unrelenting and nally successful campaign against
opium trac in China (see Brown 1973).
Opium trade was viewed as immoral by many other Westerners besides the British.
Most foreign companies trading with China during the same period did not engage in
opium trade. The American rms Olyphant & Co. and Nathan Dunn & Co. were two
leading examples. This was due to the fact that they were Quaker disciples and their
strict moral principles prevented them to participate in opium trade. In fact, the two
most important anti-opium trade conferences in the early twentieth century, the 1909
International Opium Commission held in Shanghai and the 1912 International Opium
Convention signed at the Hague, were outcomes of the American zeal against manu-
facturing and trading drugs. In sum, there was a rising anti-opium movement, based
on moral grounds, against opium trade, particularly after the turn of the twentieth
century and the establishment of the Republic of China. The pressure on the British
government from this world-wide movement resulted in what we call \the moral cost
of opium trade."
3 The Basic Model
As mentioned in the previous section, during the second half of the eighteenth and the
rst half of the nineteenth century (before the Opium War), the three most important
export items from Britain to China were opium, cotton and wool. The major import
goods from China to Britain, on the other hand, were tea and silk. Over this period,
opium rose to become the single most important trade item.17 It is therefore essential
17See Section 2.2 above for the related evidence.
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to separate opium from all other goods in the model-economy constructed below.
It should also be noted that the trade between Britain and China was essentially
monopolized by EIC until 1833 when the \free trade" regime emerged. To ease the
analysis, we shall group EIC and private traders together as a producer-trader entity.
Moreover, we shall consider a central-planner problem: given production and trading
technologies as well as the asset accumulation equation faced by the representative
producer-trader, the British government, who cares about the total volume of trade
and the net silver inow resulting from its bilateral trade relations with China, seeks
to optimize.18
Let Y o denote the output of opium and Y c the output of a composite consumption
good comprising all other goods in the economy; this composite good is taken to be
the numeraire and the relative price of opium is denoted by p. Further, denote the
exports from Britain (including British India) to China and the imports from China
to Britain as Xt and Mt, respectively. The total volume of trade (Tt) is then:
Tt = Xt +Mt: (1)
During the pre-Opium War period, Britain incurred regularly a sizable decit in its
trade with China, which was covered with silver. In fact, the British government often
injected bullion to subsidize severe silver outows suered by EIC.19 This trade subsidy
to the representative producer-trader is denoted by St and takes the form of injection
of bullion. The British government's net silver inow from trading with China (Rt)
equals its trade surplus net of its subsidy to the EIC:
Rt = Xt  Mt   ZTSt; (2)
where ZT is an indicator of trade decit that takes on the value one if a decit occurs
and zero otherwise; accordingly, a subsidy is provided only when a trade decit occurs.
We specify the trade subsidy in terms of the following two possible rules:
St =
8<: St under a xed subsidy rule (FSR)s (Mt  Xt) under a proportional subsidy rule (PSR). (3)
In the main text, we restrict our attention only to the FSR and relegate the analy-
sis under the PSR to the Appendix, where we show that our main ndings remain
qualitatively unchanged.
18See Section 2.2 under \The British Objective."
19See Chart 5 for related evidence.
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The production cost of each output is given by a standard quadratic function:
qi
 
Y it
2
=2, where i = c; o. In addition, fund (F ) and labor (L) are required for trading
and marketing each product. We denote the fund requirements per unit of opium and
per unit of the composite good by o and c; respectively, where o > c; that is,
in line with historical documentation, we assume that opium trade requires relatively
more fund for networking and marketing due to the presence of legal barriers.20 On
the other hand, purely for convenience, we assume that the labor unit requirements
for the two goods are the same and we denote them by . Thus, F it = 
iY it and
Lit = Y
i
t ; i = c; o: Total fund and labor demands are then given by Ft = F
c
t +F
o
t and
Lt = L
c
t + L
o
t , respectively.
Let At denote the total assets accumulated by the representative producer-trader
and rt and wt denote, respectively, the real interest rate and the real wage rate. Then,
the evolution of At is governed by,
At+1 = (1 + rt)At + (Xt  Mt) + ZTSt   wtLt   Ft   q
c
2
(Y ct )
2   q
o
2
(Y ot )
2 ; (4)
that is, the sources of asset accumulation include gross interest, trade surplus and
government trade subsidy, net of production, trading, networking and marketing costs.
Let Zo be an indicator of opium production that takes on the value one if opium
is produced and zero otherwise. Since opium is a \bad" to the Chinese civilians, its
import is ocially banned by the Chinese government (even though the ban may not
be fully eective). Thus, there must be legal barriers associated with opium trade and
the outbreak of an opium war can eectively lower such barriers. We capture this unit
cost of barriers in opium trade using the term (1  Zw) , where Zw takes on the value
one if a war has occurred in the past and zero otherwise; moreover,
 =
8<:  before the Opium Wars when there existed trade barriers0 after the Opium Wars when there existed free trade.
That is, had a war never been initiated (Zw = 0), the cost barrier per unit of opium
would be  > 0; after a war has occurred (Zw = 1), this unit-cost barrier takes the
value of zero. Since we will divide the time interval between the end of the Opium
Wars and the end of our analysis into two periods (the post-Opium War period and
20In the 1830s, opium was the largest British export item to China (see Section 2.2 for supporting
evidence). As Nield (2000) wrote, \Opium had by now overtaken cotton as the most valuable import
to China, and was therefore well worth the considerable investment being made in its shipment and
distribution" (p.70; italics added).
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the post-opium trade period), it is necessary to employ both the indicator function
Zw and the measure of the size of such legal barriers  (to be discussed in the next
section). Britain's exports to China then can be written as
Xt = Y
c
t + Z
optY
o
t [1  (1  Zw) ] = Y ct +  (pt)Y ot ; (5)
where  (pt)  [1  (1  Zw) ]Zopt represents the eective relative price of opium.
Based on the historical documents (see Section 2.2 under \The British Objective"),
the period-by-period objective of the British government is specied as: (1  ) [U(Rt)+
H (Tt)], where both U and H are concave functions with positive but diminishing
marginal utilities,  > 0 and  2 (0; 1). The interpretation of the ow utility is as fol-
lows. First, the British government gets utility directly from having net silver inows,
as captured by the term U(Rt). Second, as emphasized in internal correspondence and
documents, other things equal, the British government prefers a larger trade volume
and this is indicated by H (Tt). The parameter  measures the weight that the gov-
ernment puts on the volume of trade relative to that of silver inows. Third, since
opium is an addictive with detrimental socioeconomic consequences, its production
and trade are considered immoral (see Section 2.2 under \The Moral Cost of Opium
Trade"). We use  to measure the unit moral cost of selling opium, at which rate the
overall ow utility is discounted. It is obvious that, with greater self-awareness upon
establishing national identity and dignity in China, the unit moral cost associated with
exporting opium to China rises.21 For simplicity, we normalize the unit moral cost of
trading opium to zero for the period before the establishment of the Republic of China
(when all opium imports from British India ceased) and denote with  the dieren-
tial unit moral cost during the Republic of China period. We thus have the following
specication:
 =
8<:  during the Republic of China regime0 before the Republic of China regime.
We can now write the Bellman equation associated with the value function of the
British government as:
V (At) = max f(1  ) [U(Rt) + H (Tt)]g+ 1
1 + 
V (At+1) ; (6)
21Under pressure from the international community \in 1913 Britain signed the Hague anti-opium
treaty, committing itself to the eventual elimination of the worldwide opium trade. The Hague treaties
tied Great Britain to a new vision of cooperative internationalism" (Baumler 2007, p. 82).
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subject to (4), where  is the time discount rate of the British government. Substituting
(2), (1), (5) and the associated production/trading costs of opium into (4) and (6), we
can then write the central planner's optimization problem as:
V (At)=maxf(1-)

U
 
Y ct + (pt)Y
o
t -Mt-Z
TSt

+H (Y ct + (pt)Y
o
t +Mt)
g+V (At+1)
1+
;
s.t. At+1=(1+rt)At+Z
TSt-Mt+(1-
c-wt)Y
c
t + [ (pt)-
o-wt]Y
o
t -
qc (Y ct )
2+qo (Y ot )
2
2
;
andMt  0; St  0; Y ct  0; Y ot  0; where the optimization is performed with respect
to Mt; St; Y
c
t ; Y
o
t :
We note that viewing Britain's behavior as the outcome of the central planner's
optimization problem specied above is realistic given the documented cooperative
relation between the British government, on the one hand, and EIC/private traders,
on the other (see Section 2 above). For brevity, we present all rst-order and the
Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions in the Appendix.
To close the model, we let Do(p; ) be the Chinese demand for British opium, where
 is an autonomous component that stands for an increase in the opium demand func-
tion. The introduction of  facilitates the capture of the observed positive comovement
between opium price and quantity (see Section 2.1, under \The Pre-Opium War Era:
1773-1839"). Let also DM (I) be the British demand for import goods from China,
where I is the exogenously given income of the British. We follow common prac-
tice and assume that @Do(p)=@p < 0 and @DM (I)=@ I > 0, that is, the demand for
opium slopes downward (with price) and the British demand for importables rises with
British income. Equilibrium in the market of each of the two goods requires equating
the demand with the corresponding supply:
Do(pt) = Y
o
t ; (7)
DM (It) =Mt: (8)
4 Equilibrium Analysis
We focus on the addictive nature of opium and assume:
Assumption 1: "op < 1.
That is, the demand for opium is not very sensitive to changes in its relative price.
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Following the historical background delineated in Section 2.1, we shall divide the
whole period of pre-WWII Britain-China trade into three phases (see Figure 1 for the
time line):
(i) Phase I (the pre-Opium War era): ZT = 1; Zw = 0; Zo = 1;  = 0;  =  > 0:
(ii) Phase II (the post-Opium War era): ZT = 0; Zw = 1; Zo = 1;  = 0;  = 0:
(iii) Phase III (the post-opium trade era): ZT = 0; Zw = 1; Zo = 0;  =  > 0;  = 0:
Phase I captures the pre-Opium War era of 1773-1839. Specically, during this phase,
opium trade was undertaken (Zo = 1) either with local resistance or in an illegal
environment, thereby implying higher trading barriers ( =  > 0). In this phase,
Britain had a decit in its trade with China (ZT = 1), which required injections of
silver bullion. Phase II captures the post-Opium War era of 1861-1917. In Phase II,
the British trade balance with China was reversed (ZT = 0). Moreover, the Opium
Wars (Zw = 1) forced the legal trade of opium (Zo = 1 with  = 0). Finally, Phase
III captures the post-opium trade era of 1918-1933. In Phase III, the British trade
surplus with China continued (ZT = 0). At the same time, during the Republic
of China regime, a period when trading addictive goods incurred a higher moral cost
( =  > 0), opium trade ceased (Zo = 0). The assignment of values to ZT is suggested
by Charts 3 and 4, and to Zo by Charts 1 and 2.
Next, we provide a characterization of the stationary equilibrium for each of the
three phases.
4.1 Phase I: The Pre-Opium War Era
Substituting the parameter values that describe this phase (ZT = 1; Zw = 0; Zo = 1;
 = 0;  =  > 0) into the stationary version of the rst-order and market-equilibrium
conditions under FSR, we can obtain two critical relations concerning the outputs of
the composite good and opium:
c + w + qcY c = 4; (9)
o + w + qoDo(p) = 4 (p) ; (10)
(recall that  (p)  [1  (1  Zw) ]Zop). The rst expression pins down the output of
the composite good right away; notice that it does not depend on the opium price p.
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The second equation together with the opium market-equilibrium condition (7) yields
a xed-point mapping in the (relative) price of opium, p:
p = (p)  1
4
 
1   [o + w + qoDo(p)] ; (11)
where  (0) > 0 and d=dp < 0: We thus have:
Lemma 1: (Equilibrium Price in Phase I) Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique
relative price of opium p that solves (p) = 0 in stationary equilibrium.
Proof: All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
Utilizing (11), we can obtain the comparative static eects on the relative price of
opium p:
Lemma 2: (Characterization of the Equilibrium Price in Phase I) Under Assumption
1, the relative price of opium in stationary equilibrium is increasing in the eective
barrier
 


; the wage cost of opium trade (w) and the production cost of opium (qo).
Intuitively, the relative price of opium goes up to reect the increased costs resulting
from the tightening of the banning restriction
 


or from the higher values of w and
qo: Focusing on the eect of barriers, an increase in  shifts up the downward-sloping
xed-point mapping (p), thereby leading to a higher xed point of the relative price
of opium.
To complete the analysis in this phase, we solve for the stationary equilibrium
values of trade subsidy and of the producer-trader's assets using:
A =
1
r

DM (I)  S + 3Y c + 3 (p)Do(p)  q
c
2
(Y c)2   q
o
2
Do(p)2

; (12)
U 0

Y c +  (p)Do(p) DM (I)  S = H 0 [Y c +  (p)Do(p) +M ] =2; (13)
where the notation \ 0 " denotes total derivative. Note that equation (13) yields:
S(p) = S. Next, we dene U   RU 00=U 0 as the elasticity of marginal utility of net
silver inow and H   TH 00=H 0 as the elasticity of marginal utility of total trade.
We then impose:
Assumption 2: RT
H
U
> 1.
Under Assumption 2, the curvature of the H function is suciently high compared
with that of U . We can then obtain:
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Lemma 3: (Characterization of Equilibrium Trade Subsidy and Producer-Trader's
Assets in Phase I) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the trade subsidy in stationary equi-
librium is negatively related to the relative price of opium, whereas the producer-trader's
assets in stationary equilibrium are positively related to the opium price.
The intuition is straightforward. If the demand for opium is price inelastic (Assumption
1) and the curvature condition of the ow utility is met (Assumption 2), then an
increase in p will raise the British net silver inow. Hence, the subsidy for osetting
the trade decit can be reduced.22 The eects of a change in opium price on producer-
trader's assets involve both a cost eect and a silver inow eect, where the latter
depends on the price elasticity of the opium demand. First, when the price of opium
goes up, the quantity demanded is reduced and hence more assets can be accumulated
due to cost saving. Moreover, if opium demand is inelastic (Assumption 1), then the
net silver inow from exporting opium increases so that asset accumulation is even
higher.
4.2 Phase II: The Post-Opium War Era
Given the terms that describe this phase (ZT = 0; Zw = 1; Zo = 1;  = 0;  =
0, implying  (p) = p and S = 0), we can manipulate the rst-order and market-
equilibrium conditions in stationary equilibrium to obtain:
o + w + qoY o
p
  1 = 
(p; Y c; )  U
0 + H 0
 U 0 + H 0 ; (14)
p =
o + w + qoY o
c + w + qcY c
: (15)
Using (14), we can write Y c as a function of p and further apply (15) to derive a
xed-point mapping in p:
Y c = Y c(p) (16)
p =
o + w + qoDo(p)
c + w + qcY c(p)
 	(p) (17)
22The prediction of Lemma 3 seems to be consistent with the existing empirical evidence. For
instance, in the pre-Opium War era (1773-1833), the correlation coecient between the average opium
price and the British silver outows (net exports to China) is -0.783 (0.777). It may be recalled that
the trade subsidy is supposed to take the form of bullion injection (silver ows) and is inversely related
to net exports.
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Concerning now the composite good output schedule given by (16), Figure 2 gives the
graphical representation of Y c(p) in relation to the opium price. Under the realistic
assumption of opium demand being inelastic (Assumption 1), Y c is decreasing in p
so that the supply curve of Y c is downward sloping in the relative price of opium.
Furthermore, producer-trader's assets in stationary equilibrium are given by:
A =
1
r

DM (I) + (1  c   w)Y c + (p  o   w)Do(p)  q
c
2
(Y c)2   q
o
2
[Do(p)]2

:
(18)
Dene the price elasticity of the composite good supply as cp= (p=Y c)(@Y c=@p):
The following condition then imposes unity as an upper bound on this supply elasticity:
Assumption 3: cp  1.
We then obtain:
Lemma 4: (Equilibrium Price and Output of Opium in Phase II) Under Assumptions
1 and 3, there exists a unique relative price of opium p that solves 	(p) = 0 in
stationary equilibrium. Moreover, the supply of the composite good is decreasing in
the relative price of opium and increasing in the opium trading cost o, whereas the
equilibrium opium price rises with the opium trading cost.
The intuition of Lemma 4 can be understood with the help of Figure 2. A rising
trading cost of opium in this period lead to an upward shift of both the opium (Y o)
and the composite-good (Y c) supply curves. Hence, a new equilibrium resulted with
a higher opium price and a larger quantity of the composite good.23
There are two possible cases in steady state, depending on the slope of the xed-
point mapping. The rst case is 	p < 0, where we have a downward sloping curve
	 (p). The second case is 1 > 	p > 0, which yields an upward sloping curve 	 (p) ;
but with a slope less than unity. Both cases give us a unique p.
4.3 Phase III: The Post-Opium Trade Era
We nally turn to the derivation of the key stationary equilibrium equations in Phase
III, when ZT = 0; Zw = 1; Zo = 0;  = 0;  =  > 0 and hence with the opium
supply and trade completely banned Y o = 0 (and with the relative price p eliminated
23As a matter of fact, the correlation coecient between the opium price and the output of the
composite good for the period of 1867-1917 is 0.56, which supports our ndings.
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throughout):
Y c = (Y c; w)  1
qc

2H 0
H 0   U 0   
c   w

; (19)
A =
1
r

DM (I) + (1  c   w)Y c   q
c
2
(Y c)2

: (20)
Consider the following regularity condition,
Assumption 4: (0; w) > 0 and @=@Y c < 1.
We can then establish:
Lemma 5: (Equilibrium-Composite-Good Output in Phase III) Under Assumptions
1 and 4, there exists a unique composite-good output Y c

that solves Y c

= (Y c

; w)
and is decreasing in the cost of labor w.
Since the xed-point mapping (Y c; w) is upward sloping but atter than the 45
line, in response to a higher wage and hence a higher trading cost, the output of the
composite good must fall.
5 Phase Transitions
We can express the value function (6) in stationary equilibrium as:
V (; ) =
1 + 

(1  ) [U(R) + H (T )] ;
where both R and T on the RHS take on their optimized values. In each phase, this
value function becomes:
VI
 
; 0

=
1 + 


U

Y c + (1  )pY o  M   S+ H Y c + (1  )pY o +M	 ;
(21)
VII
 
0; 

=
1 + 

 
1   [U (Y c + pY o  M) + H (Y c + pY o +M)] ; (22)
VIII (0; 0) =
1 + 

[U (Y c  M) + H (Y c +M)] : (23)
>From the information on the historical background (see Section 2.1), we know
that the eective barrier on opium trade imposed by the Chinese government varied
during the rst phase. In particular, it has been recognized that in the early stages of
Phase I, the eective barrier on opium trade was very low, as the Chinese ocials were
bribed so that they did not take any banning action in local communities. Toward
the end of Phase I, however, the Ching Dynasty government decided to take serious
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action by appointing Commissioner Lin to eradicate opium trade. This led to a sharp
increase in the eective barrier. After the Opium Wars, opium trade was legalized and
the eective barrier was removed.
Let G denote the British war expenses. We dene the net welfare change from
moving from Phase i to Phase j as ij ; i = I; II and j = II; III. Then, we have:
III
 


= VII (0; 0) G  VI
 
; 0

IIIII
 


= VIII (0; 0)  VII
 
0; 

:
We now formulate multi-period discrete choices in our staged development frame-
work to endogenize institutions. Specically, for any given pair of dierentials in opium
trade barriers and moral costs,
 
; 

, we fully characterize how changes in economic
primitives may cause an endogenous regime switch in institutions, captured by the
transition from one phase to another. Based on the existing historical data and doc-
uments, the primitives that we analyze include government objectives (especially the
preference parameter ) and warfare expenses (G), as well as the opium trading cost
(o) and demand shocks ().
5.1 From Phase I to II: The Colonization of Hong Kong
The transition from Phase I to Phase II can be accounted for by the existence of a
(unique) critical level of trade barriers, denoted as c; such that III (c) = 0: To
show this, we must examine the eects of the trade barriers  on the welfare gain from
moving from Phase I to Phase II. Consider,
Assumption 5: G < VII (0; 0)  VI (1; 0).
The interpretation of Assumption 5 is that the gain from moving from no trade to free
trade in opium is larger than the cost of wars. We can then plot the III () schedule
in Figure 3, which is upward sloping with III (0) < 0 < III (1). The rst inequality
comes from the fact that VI (0; 0) = VII (0; 0) and the second follows Assumption 5.
We therefore obtain:
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1-5, there exists a unique critical level of trade-
barriers c such that, for any  2 (c; 1), a war is instigated and Phase II emerges.
The intuition is clear. When the eective barrier is absent, there is no need to start a
war. When the eective barrier is at its maximum, so that all opium trade is banned,
the war is unavoidable. Thus, it is to the benet of Britain to initiate an opium
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war as long as the eective trade barrier on opium is above the threshold level c. In
particular, a decrease in the threshold c; which is caused by a change in the primitives
G; ; o; or , is more likely to induce an institutional change and to lead eventually
to the colonization of Hong Kong and the legalization of opium trade.
5.2 From Phase II to III: The Abandonment of Opium Trade
The transition from Phase II to Phase III can be accounted for by the existence of
a critical level of moral cost denoted as c and dened by equation IIIII (c) = 0:
To show this, we analyze the eects of the dierential moral cost  on the welfare
gain from moving from Phase II to Phase III. Figure 4 depicts the IIIII () schedule,
which is increasing in  with IIIII (0) < 0 <II III (1). The rst inequality comes
from the intuition that opium trade is preferred in the absence of moral cost and the
second is due to the fact that VII (0; 1) = 0. This leads to:
Proposition 2: Under Assumptions 1-4, there exists a unique critical level of moral
cost c such that, for any
 2 (c; 1), all opium trade ceases and Phase III emerges.
Intuitively, when the moral cost is absent, there is no incentive for moving into Phase
III, because it is strictly dominated by Phase II. When the moral cost is at its maxi-
mum, opium trade is not conducted, since it does not yield any utility; thus, Phase III
is the only choice. Hence, as long as the moral cost exceeds the critical value c, it is
to Britain's benet to move into Phase III and abandon opium trade. Summarizing, a
decrease in the threshold c; caused by a change in the primitives ; 
o; or ; is likely
to induce an institutional change that will result in the abandonment of opium trade.
6 Comparative Statics
In the comparative-static exercises performed below, we consider the following cate-
gories of shocks on the critical levels of the transitional parameters c and c: (i) a
shock in the cost of warfare (a change in G); (ii) two structural shocks: a preference
shock (a change in ) and a cost shock to opium supply (a change in o); and (iii)
an autonomous opium demand shock (an increase in ). To evaluate the changes
in c and c resulting from these shocks, we totally dierentiate III (c) = 0 and
IIIII (c) = 0; respectively.
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6.1 A Shock in the Cost of Warfare
Since the transition from Phase II to III does not involve G, the eect of a change in
G falls only on the critical level of eective barrier c. We can establish:
Proposition 3: Under Assumptions 1-3, an increase in the warfare cost delays the
transition from Phase I to Phase II.
Graphically, a change in the military spending G shifts down the III () locus by
the same magnitude as depicted in Figure 3. Thus, an increase in G raises the critical
level of ; i.e., for a given value of ; as war becomes more costly, it is less likely for it
to occur; hence, c goes up.
6.2 Changes in Structural Parameters
We consider two types of structural shocks, one to preferences and another to opium
trade cost.
6.2.1 A Preference Shock
We analyze the eects of a preference shock in favor of the volume of trade, i.e., an
increase in : We assume that the total volume of trade rises in the Republic of China
regime, which is consistent with the data (compare the total volume of trade before
and after 1917 in Chart 4); that is,
Assumption 6: TIII > TII .
We then obtain:
Proposition 4: Under Assumptions 1-6, a preference shift toward the volume of trade
speeds up the transition from Phase I to Phase II as well as from Phase II to Phase
III.
In Figure 3, we illustrate the eect of a rise in ; which rotates the III () locus
counterclockwise. Thus, c decreases. As we put more weight on the volume of trade
in the preference function, the critical trade barrier is more likely to decrease. Conse-
quently, for any given ; we are more likely to enter Phase II. In Figure 4, we depict
the eect of a rise in ; which shifts the IIIII () locus up; thus, c decreases. As we
put more weight on the volume of trade in the preference function (an increase in ),
less emphasis is put on opium trade due to its declining share in total trade. This is
also in accord with the actual experience. For instance, opium share was more than
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40% in total British exports to China in the mid nineteenth century, but declined to
less than 10% in the beginning of the twentieth century. As a result, for any given
level of the moral cost ; we are more likely to enter Phase III of no opium trade.
6.2.2 A Cost Shock to Opium Supply
We consider a cost shock to opium supply by taking an increase in o to represent
a deterioration of the business environment within which opium is traded. We as-
sume that the direct price eect is stronger than the cross-market spillover eect via
consumption substitution; that is,
Assumption 7: @Y
c
@o +

@Y c
@pII
+Do + pII
@Do
@pII

dpII
do < 0.
We can now establish:
Proposition 5: Under Assumptions 1-5 and 7, a rise in the cost of opium supply
delays the transition from Phase I to Phase II, but speeds up the transition from Phase
II to Phase III.
The intuition goes as follows. As the business environment within which opium is
traded deteriorates (o increases), there is no reason for the British government to put
additional eort (as mirrored by a war) into expanding opium trade. So the likelihood
of starting an opium war diminishes, which is reected in an increase in c. Similarly,
c falls when the production cost of Y
o increases. As o goes up, the opium trading
environment deteriorates, and hence the cost of stopping opium trade is lower. Thus,
for any given level of the moral cost ; we are more likely to enter Phase III of no
opium trade.
6.3 An Autonomous Opium Demand Shock
Finally, we analyze the eects of an autonomous demand shock to opium trade, which
in terms of our model is captured by an increase in . Consider,
Proposition 6: Under Assumptions 1-3, an autonomous increase in opium demand
speeds up the transition from Phase I to Phase II, but delays the transition from Phase
II to Phase III.
The intuition is readily understood. If opium demand increases, then it is worth
putting more eort (e.g., initiating a war) to expand opium trade; hence, for any given
; we are more likely to enter Phase II of the legal opium trade period . On the other
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hand, if the demand for British opium drops, as a result of the sharp increase in the
domestic opium supply, there is less incentive to maintain opium trade. Hence, for any
given level of the moral cost ; we are more likely to enter Phase III of no opium trade.
7 Toward Understanding the Colonization of Hong Kong
Before proceeding further in the analysis, we tabulate our comparative-statics results.
Comparative Critical Value Transition
Statics c c I to II II to III
G " + n.a. slower n.a.
 "     faster faster
o " +   slower faster
 "   + faster slower
Note: n.a. stands for non-applicable.
Using the comparative statics above, we would like to investigate the \alternative"
history as suggested in the following quote by Bard (2000, p. 13):
\The facts of history cannot be altered. Is there then any prot in speculat-
ing what might have happened if certain events had or had not taken place?
Perhaps, if there are lessons to be learned from such speculations for, after
all, events of today will become history tomorrow, next year, or a century
later."
More specically, we are now ready to introduce the following three hypotheses, which
suggest how the course of history might have been altered:
[Hypothesis 1] Due to high warfare and low opium trading costs, Phase I lasted for
a long period of 70 years (1773-1842).
[Hypothesis 2] Due to high valuation of the total volume of trade, high opium trad-
ing costs and the expectation of continuously rising opium demand, the Opium
Wars were declared and the Hong Kong colony emerged, leading to a transition
to Phase II.
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[Hypothesis 3] Due to a signicant drop in opium demand and a rising opium trading
cost, opium trade was abandoned, leading to a transition to Phase III.
These hypotheses are readily corroborated by our model, which is built to capture the
historical environment and some important observations of the particular era before
and after the Opium Wars. Of course, due to data limitation, it is impossible to
formulate econometric tests of our hypotheses. Nonetheless, the existing historical data
and documents support the proposed underlying factors driving the two transitions
based on our theoretical model. They also indicate how opium trade \had determined
the course of history of that period and region, and how easily that course might have
been altered, preventing the conict, and possibly subsequent imperialist policy of
western nations in China" (Bard, 2000, p. 14).
Next we present a selected sample of the existing evidence, found either in the
data or in historical documents, which provides support to our hypotheses. More
specically, according to our hypotheses, there are seven cases where the shocks that
we consider played a pivotal role. These cases are tabulated below and are labeled D-1
to D-7.
Supporting Evidence Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
G high (D-1) n.a. n.a.
 n.a. high (D-3) n.a.
o low (D-2) high (D-4) high (D-6)
 n.a. high (D-5) low (D-7)
(D-1) This case refers to the role played by the cost of conducting a war (G). Morse
(1910) described the mission of William John Napier, the rst Chief Superinten-
dent of trade at Canton, as follows: \The chief superintendent was instructed
that every eort was to be made to conform to all Chinese regulations and to
consider all Chinese prejudices, and at the same time was forbidden to call in the
aid of the armed forces of the Crown" (p. 121). We take this quote to indicate
that Britain had no intention of initiating a war against China because warfare
was high. Britain would prefer to maintain the status quo (Phase I).
(D-2) Although the Chinese government banned opium trade right from the begin-
ning, this did not lead to a prohibitively high trading cost of opium. The reason
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is that the banning acts were never seriously implemented by local Chinese o-
cials, who were bribed by British merchants. This is reected in the rising opium
shipments shown in Chart 1.
(D-3) As documented in Charts 3 and 4, the total real Britain-China trade was
rising over time during both the pre- and post-Opium War periods. This ex-
pansion of trade was one of Britain's important objectives. As Pritchard has
pointed out, the basis of British-Chinese relations was \the commercial inter-
course" (Pritchard 1970, Preface). Moreover, according to the instructions given
to Lord Macartney by the Secretary of State for War Henry Dundas in 1792, in
order to facilitate trade with China, the British government had been looking
for \a more convenient situation than Canton, where our present Warehouse are
at a great distance from our Ships" (Tuck 2000, vol. 2, p. 237). Naturally, the
benet from such a settlement increased with the volume of trade.
(D-4) As depicted in Chart 5, opium trade reversed the British silver outows. Thus,
opium trade had been a very important component of Britain-China trade. How-
ever, the growing consumption of opium raised the awareness and concerns re-
garding its devastating eects of the Chinese high-ranking administrators. In
1839, Commissioner Tse-hsu Lin ordered the immediate surrender of all opium
brought to China. This raised the opium trading cost to a historically high level.
Consequently, \It was now realised even in London that no change was possible
without a show of force, which might lead to war" (Tuck 2000, vol. 9, pp. 196-7).
(D-5) The expectation of a continuously rising opium demand, captured by the posi-
tive demand shock (increase in ), is supported by the positive comovement be-
tween opium quantity and price during Phase I. Using the data on opium price
and shipments in the period 1773-1838, we computed the correlation coecient
to be 0:12; which veries our claim.
(D-6) The cost of trading opium rose drastically following the success of the 1906
imperial edict that banned opium. As Blue (2000) pointed out, the success
\reected the intensication in China over the previous decade of aversion to the
drug. The aversion was part of the rise in nationalist sentiment at the turn of
the century, stimulated by such factors as the 1895 defeat at the hands of Japan,
the subsequent new imperialist incursions by other powers, and the humiliation
delivered by the anti-Boxer expeditionary forces in 1900" (p.40). \The edict also
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reected new concepts of citizenship ... creating a new category of people who
would be left out of the modern concept of citizenship" (Baumler 2007, p. 56).
Eventually, in 1911, Britain agreed to stop all opium exports from India into
China within seven years.
(D-7) In the post-OpiumWar period, the rapid increase in the domestic production of
opium in China led to a signicant decline in the demand for imported opium. In
terms of our model, this negative shock on imported opium demand seen in the
data can be understood as an increase in the supply of opium. In other words, an
increase in domestic supply is equivalent to a decrease in import demand; thus,
there should be a negative comovement between opium quantity and price during
Phase II. Indeed, the correlation coecient between opium price and quantity in
the period 1867-1917 is  0:82; which is consistent with our analysis.
In sum, while high warfare (D-1) and low opium trading costs (D-2) were the primary
factors preventing initially the breakout of the Opium Wars, in the end the wars
and the consequential colonization of Hong Kong were mainly driven by the British
government's high valuation of the total volume trade with China (D-3), the rising
opium trading cost (D-4) and the anticipated increase in China's demand for opium
(D-5). Also, as a result of the anticipated increase in the opium trading cost (D-6) and
the sharp drop in opium demand under the Republic of China regime (D-7), opium
trade was abandoned and a period of more conventional trade with China began.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have constructed a staged development framework with multi-period discrete choices
to study the trade-induced colonization of Hong Kong and the history of opium trade
between Britain and China. The framework has enabled us to characterize each of the
three phases involved, namely, the pre-Opium War era, the post-Opium War era and
the post-opium trade era. We have also illustrated theoretically how the transition
between two phases emerged in response to some key underlying factors. For the rst
transition, these factors included the British government's high valuation of the total
volume of trade with China, the warfare cost, the cost of trading opium and the ex-
pectation of a rising opium demand. For the second transition, the key factors were
a decrease in China's import demand for opium and the British government's moral
cost of opium trade. Thus, we are able to explain why Britain instigated the Opium
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Wars and colonized Hong Kong in mid-nineteenth century (rst transition) as well as
why it abandoned opium trade a few years after the turn of the twentieth century
(second transition). Finally, we have put together historical data and documentation
that provide support to our theoretical results.
While our model is specically designed to capture the historical observations of
the Britain-China trade during the period 1773-1933 and the colonization of Hong
Kong, the general methodology and framework can be readily modied to study the
establishment of other colonies, such as Korea, Macau and Taiwan, where trade also
played a signicant role. For example, over the long period of 442 years (1557-1999),
Macau was under Portuguese occupation and served as an important center for Por-
tuguese trade with China and Japan. During the sixteenth century and from 1848 to
early 1870s, it was also a tracking point for skilled slaves from Southern China to
Portugal or South American ports.
Moreover, following the assassination of the Korean Empress Myeongseong by
Japanese agents in 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Korea came under
Japanese rule with the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty. This occupation lasted from
1910 to 1945. It formally ended with Japan's defeat in WWII. While imperialistic
expansion to Northeast and Central Asia was one of the primary factors leading to
this colonization, its role for trade with China, Russia and, through this, Europe was
also important.
Similarly to the colonization of Korea, Taiwan was ceded to Japan from 1895 to
1945 with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the First Sino-Japanese War in
1894. The primary reason for the establishment of this colony was again Japan's
imperialistic expansion, only this time to Southeast and South Asia. Yet, potential
trade with Southern China and Southeast Asia played a non-negligible role.
The development experiences of these colonies are also of particular interest. Al-
though Macau is just a short distance from Hong Kong and was also a colony of a
Western European country, its development has been drastically dierent from that of
Hong Kong. Among others, Macau lacked signicantly in terms of growth compared
to Hong Kong. On the contrary, Korea and Taiwan, who were both under an entirely
dierent Imperial Japanese rule, have grown rapidly during the post-WWII period and
joined Hong Kong in the group of the newly industrialized Asian Tigers. Despite such
noticeably disparate development patterns, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
systematic study of these colonial episodes. We regard this as a potentially fruitful
avenue for future work.
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Appendix
(For Online Publication)
In this Appendix, we summarize data sources, currency exchange rates and weight
measurements. We also provide the mathematical details of the results established
in the main text. Finally, we present the results under an alternative subsidy rule,
namely the case of the proportional subsidy rule (PSR), where St = s (Mt  Xt).
A. Summary of the Data
There are various sources, including scattered data, in Hsiao (1974) and Tuck
(2000). To put together a meaningful statistical analysis, we have used proper con-
versions of currency and weight measurements. There were three major currencies
used: the tael, the British pound and the Spanish dollar. These were converted in the
following manner: (i) the basic unit of Chinese currency is the tael (tls), known as
\Yuan Pao" (silver sycee), which was worth 1:208 oz. of pure silver; and, (ii) 1 tael =
$1=3 or $1:388 (Spanish dollar). Also, there were several weight measurements with
the following conversion rates: (i) the chest was used as the basis for measuring opium
weight; one chest of opium contained around 135 pounds of the substance; (ii) tael
was also used as a weight measurement unit in China with 1 tael = 113 oz., 16 taels
= 1 catty (Chinese kg) or 113 lbs; and, (iii) other weight measurement units include, 1
picul = 13313 lbs, 1 long ton = 16:8 piculs, and 1 short ton = 15 piculs.
B. Optimization under FSR
Under xed subsidy rule (FSR), the rst-order conditions with respect to M; S;
Y c and Y o are:
(1  )   U 0 + H 0  1
1 + 
V 0+1  0; M  0; (B1)8<:   (1  )U 0 + 11+V 0+1  0; S  0; if ZT = 1S = 0; if ZT = 0 (B2)
(1  )  U 0 + H 0+ V 0+1
1 + 
(1  c   w   qcY c)  0; Y c  0; (B3)
(1  )  U 0 + H 0 (p) + V 0+1
1 + 
[ (p)  o   w   qoY o]  0; Y o  0; (B4)
with complementary slackness, where the subscript \+1" indicates the variable in
the next-period. While the last two conditions regarding the levels of outputs are
standard (they equate the marginal benet of production with the respective marginal
cost), the rst two deserve further comments. Concerning (B1), high imports, on the
one hand, lower the British net silver inow and reduce the representative producer-
trader's asset accumulation, but, on the other, raise the total volume of trade. Imports
are optimized when the marginal cost and marginal benet are equalized. In the case
i
where a trade decit occurs, (B2) indicates that the optimal level of the government
subsidy to the representative producer-trader is to equalize the losses from the current
net silver outow to the gains from the higher assets accumulated in the future. Also,
the Benveniste-Scheinkman equation is:
V 0 =
1 + r
1 + 
V 0+1: (B5)
C. Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1: Substituting the restrictions associated with Phase I into the
rst-order conditions (B1)-(B4) and focusing on the interior solution, we have that in
stationary equilibrium:
 U 0 + H 0   1
1 + 
V 0 = 0; (C1)
 U 0 + 1
1 + 
V 0 = 0; (C2)
U 0 + H 0 +
V 0
1 + 
[1  c   w   qcY c] = 0; (C3)
 
U 0 + H 0

 (p) +
V 0
1 + 
[ (p)  o   w   qoY o] = 0: (C4)
Evaluating the Benveniste-Scheinkman equation (B5) in a stationary equilibrium yields
r = , whereas the asset evolution equation implies:
rA M+ S+(1  c   w)Y c+[ (p)  o   w]Y o  q
c
2
(Y c)2  q
o
2
(Y o)2 = 0: (C5)
Combining (C1) and (C2), we have:
U 0 =
1
1 + 
V 0 =
H 0
2
: (C6)
Then (C3) and (C6) together yield (9). Also, (C4) and (C6) together give
o + w + qoY o = 4 (p) : (C7)
Combining (7) and (C7), we obtain (10), which can be manipulated to get (11).
Finally, it is straightforward to obtain the following properties of (p):  (0) =
1
4(1 ) [
o + w + qoDo(0)] > 0 and ddp =
qo
4(1 )
@Do(p)
@p < 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Straightforward dierentiation yields
dp
d
=
@=@
1  @=@p =
p
1  
1
1 +

qoDo
o+w+qoDo

"op
> 0; (C8)
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where "op is the price elasticity of opium demand. The other comparative statics follow
in a similar manner. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Equation (C6) can be manipulated to yield (13). Substituting (7),
(8), (9), and (C7) into (C5), we get (12). Straightforward dierentiation implies:
S0(p) =

1  R
T
H
U

1 +
p
Do
@Do
@p

(1  )Do =

1  R
T
H
U
 
1  "op

(1  )Do;
(C9)
r
dA
dp
=  qo@D
o
@p
+

2 +
R
T
H
U
 
1  "op

(1  )Do: (C10)
>From (C9), it is clear that under Assumption 1, 1   "op > 0 and under Assumption
2, 1   RT HU < 0. Hence, S0(p) < 0. The result regarding the producer-trader's assets
follows from @D
o
@p < 0 and Assumption 1, which imply, respectively, that both the rst
and the second term in (C10) are positive. 
Proof of Lemma 4: Substituting the restrictions associated with Phase II into the
rst-order conditions and focusing on an interior stationary equilibrium, we obtain:
 U 0 + H 0   1
1 + 
V 0 = 0; (C11)
U 0 + H 0 +
V 0
1 + 
(1  c   w   qcY c) = 0; (C12)
 
U 0 + H 0

p+
V 0
1 + 
(p  o   w   qoY o) = 0; (C13)
rA M + (1  c   w)Y c + [p  o   w]Y o   q
c
2
(Y c)2   q
o
2
(Y o)2 = 0: (C14)
Also, the Benveniste-Sheinkman equation yields r = . From (C11), we have:
 U 0 + H 0 = 1
1 + 
V 0: (C15)
Then (C13) together with (C15) yield (14), while (C12) together with (C13) give (15).
Substituting (7) and (8) into (C14), we get (18). Also, under Assumptions 1 and 2,
straightforward dierentiation of 
(p; Y c; ) yields the following:

p =
@

@p
=
2H 0U 00
( U 0 + H 0)2

1  R
T
H
U
 
1  "op

Do > 0;

Y =
@

@Y c
=
2H 0U 00
( U 0 + H 0)2

1  R
T
H
U

> 0;

 =
@

@
=
2H 0U 00
( U 0 + H 0)2

1  R
T
H
U

p
@Do
@
> 0:
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Substituting (7) and 
(p; Y c; ) into (14), we obtain (16), where dY
c
dp =   +
p
Y < 0,
dY c
d =
1

Y

qo
p
@Do
@   


, dY
c
do =
1
p
Y
> 0, and    o + w +  1 + "op qoDo =p2 >
0. Next, substituting (7) and (16) into (15), we get (17), where
	p =
@	
@p
=  

qoDo
o + w + qoDo

"op +

qcY c
c + w + qcY c

cp;
1 	p = 1 +

qoDo
o + w + qoDo

"op  

qcY c
c + w + qcY c

cp:
Then, under Assumptions 1 and 3, we have two alternative cases: either 	p < 0 or
1 > 	p > 0. In either case, a unique xed point in p is ensured. Finally, totally
dierentiating (17), we obtain:
dp
do
=
1
1 	p
1
c + w + qcY c(p)

1  q
c

Y

:
Combining (7), (14), (15) and (17), we have: dY
c
dp =

p
qc 
Y . Since
dY c
dp < 0 under
Assumption 1, we conclude that qc < 
Y , which in turn yields dp
=do > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 5: Substituting the restrictions associated with Phase III into the
rst-order conditions and focusing on an interior stationary equilibrium, we obtain: 
1     U 0 + H 0  1
1 + 
V 0 = 0; (C16)
 
1    U 0 + H 0+ V 0
1 + 
(1  c   w   qcY c) = 0; (C17)
and (20). Also, the Benveniste-Sheinkman equation yields r = . From (C16), we have 
1     U 0 + H 0 = 1
1 + 
V 0: (C18)
Substituting (C18) in (C17) yields (19). Then direct dierentiation of (Y c; w) yields
the following partial derivatives:
Y =
@
@Y c
=
2H 0U 00
qc (H 0   U 0)2

1  R
T
H
U

> 0;
w =
@
@w
=   
qc
< 0:
Since a rise in the wage cost should reduce production (other things equal), we can
conclude from (19):
@Y c
@w
=
w
1  Y < 0 =) 1  Y > 0;
So (Y c; w) has a positive slope in Y c that is less than unity. This together with the
other half of Assumption 4, namely that (0; w) > 0; ensures the existence of a unique
xed point. 
iv
Proof of Proposition 1: It is clear that,
III (0) = VII (0; 0) G  VI (0; 0) =  G
Also, if the war expenses G are not too high, so that Assumption 5 is met, then
III (1) = VII (0; 0) G  VI (1; 0) > 0
since VII (0; 0)  VI (1; 0) > 0. In addition, we can derive:
dIII
 


d
=  dVI
 
; 0

d
=
1 + 

U 0Do

2 +
R
T
H
U

p"op (
o + w + 2qoDo)
o + w +
 
1 + "op

qoDo
> 0:
Thus, the III
 


schedule is monotone (positively sloped) with III (0) < 0 <
III (1). By the Mean Value Theorem, there exists a unique critical value c 2 (0; 1)
such that III (c) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2: It is easily seen that
IIIII (0) = VIII (0; 0)  VII (0; 0) < 0
IIIII (1) = VIII (0; 0)  VII (0; 1) = VIII (0; 0) > 0:
Moreover, we have:
dIIIII
 


d
=  dVII
 
0; 

d
=
1 + 

(U + H) > 0:
Straightforward application of the Mean Value Theorem proves the existence of a
unique critical value c 2 (0; 1) such that III (c) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: Recall the denition of the critical transitional parameter c:
III (c) = VII (0; 0) G  VI (c; 0)
=
1 + 

[U (RII) + H (TII)] G  1 + 

[U (RI) + H (TI)]
=
1 + 

[U (Y c + pIIY
o  M) + H (Y c + pIIY o +M)] G (C19)
 1 + 

fU [Y c + (1  c)pIY o  M   S] + H [Y c + (1  c)pIY o +M ]g
= 0:
In response to a change in G, the endogenous variables Y c; p and S remain all un-
changed. Hence, it follows from (C19) that
dIII (c)
dG
=
@III (c)
@G
=  1;
v
which proves the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Totally dierentiating (C19) yields,
dc
d
=  @III (c) =@
@III (c) =@
=   H (TII) H (TI) + U
0 (RI)S
U 0 (RI) pIDo"op

2 + RT
H
U

o+w+2qoDo
o+w+(1+"op)qoDo
< 0;
where S =  H 0 (TI) =2U 00 (RI) > 0 and H (TII)   H (TI) > 0 due to the fact that
Phase II is the free-trade regime after the Opium Wars and hence the trade volume is
expected to increase.
Next, recall the denition of the critical transitional parameter c:
IIIII (c) = VIII (0; 0)  VII (0; c)
=
1 + 

[U (RIII) + H (TIII)]  1 + 

(1  c) [U (RII) + H (TII)]
=
1 + 

[U (Y c  M) + H (Y c +M)] (C20)
 1 + 

(1  c) [U (Y c + pIIY o  M) + H (Y c + pIIY o +M)]
= 0:
Totally dierentiating (C20) gives,
dc
d
=  @IIIII (c) =@
@IIIII (c) =@

=  H (TIII)  (1  c)H (TII)
U (RII) + H (TII)
< 0;
where the numerator is positive because, under Assumption 6, TIII > TII . 
Proof of Proposition 5: Totally dierentiating (C19), taking into account the rst-order
conditions in each phase, we nd:
dc
do
=  @III (c) =@
o
@III (c) =@
  @III (c) =@
o
1+
 U
0 (RI) pIDo"op

2 + RT
H
U

o+w+2qoDo
o+w+(1+"op)qoDo
;
so that
sign

dc
do

=   sign

@III (c)
@o

: (C21)
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The expression of @III (c) =@
o can be written as:

1 + 
@III (c)
@o
=

U 0 (RII) + H 0 (TII)
 @Y c
@o
+

@Y c
@pII
+Do + pII
@Do
@pII

dpII
do

-(1-c)

U 0 (RI)+H 0 (TI)

Do+pI
@Do
@pI

dpI
do
+U 0 (RI)Sp
dpI
do
=

U 0 (RII) + H 0 (TII)
 @Y c
@o
+

@Y c
@pII
+Do + pII
@Do
@pII

dpII
do

-U 0 (RI) (1  c)Do(1  "op)

2 +
R
T
H
U

dpI
do
:
If the direct price eect of the supply shock to opium demand dominates the spillover
eects on Y c; so that Assumption 7 holds, then @III(c)@o < 0 and, from (C21),
dc
do > 0.
Similarly, dierentiating (C20) yields:
dc
do
=  @IIIII (c) =@
o
@IIIII (c) =@

=
(1  c) [U 0 (RII) + H 0 (TII)]
h
@Y c
@o +

@Y c
@pII
+Do + pII
@Do
@pII

dpII
do
i
U (RII) + H (TII)
;
which is negative under Assumption 7. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Totally dierentiating (C19), we get:
dc
d
=  @III (c) =@
@III (c) =@
=   [U
0 (RII) + H 0 (TII)] II
1+
 U
0 (RI) pIDo"op

2 + RT
H
U

o+w+2qoDo
o+w+(1+"op)qoDo
< 0;
where II  qopII
Y @D
o
@    
Y
dpII
d > 0.
Similarly, total dierentiating (C20) implies:
dc
d
=  @IIIII (c) =@
@IIIII (c) =@

=
(1  c) [U 0 (RII) + H 0 (TII)] II
U (RII) + H (TII)
> 0;
which completes the proof. 
D. The Case of PSR
Under PSR, St = s (Mt  Xt). The rst-order conditions with respect toM; s; Y c;
Y o are:
(1  )  (1 + s)U 0 + H 0  1  s
1 + 
V 0+1  0; M  0; (D1)
vii
8><>:
(M  X)
h
  (1  )U 0 + 11+V 0+1
i
 0; s  0; if ZT = 1
s = 0; if ZT = 0
(D2)
(1  ) (1 + s)U 0 + H 0+ V 0+1
1 + 
(1  s  c   w   qcY c)  0; Y c  0; (D3)
(1  ) (1 + s)U 0 + H 0 (p) + V 0+1
1 + 
[(1  s) (p)  o   w   qoY o]  0; Y o  0;
(D4)
with complementary slackness. The Benveniste-Scheinkman equation is the same as
the one in the FSR case (see equation (B5)). Substituting the restrictions that describe
this phase (ZT = 1; Zw = 0; Zo = 1;  = ;  = 0;) into (D1)-(D4) we have
  (1 + s)U 0 + H 0   1  s
1 + 
V 0+1 = 0; (D5)
 U 0 + 1
1 + 
V 0+1 = 0; (D6)
(1 + s)U 0 + H 0 +
V 0+1
1 + 
[1  s  c   w   qcY c] = 0; (D7)

(1 + s)U 0 + H 0

 (p) +
V 0+1
1 + 
[(1  s) (p)  o   w   qoY o] = 0; (D8)
Also, the asset accumulation equation is:
A+1 = (1 + r)A  (1  s)M + (1  s  c   w)Y c + (D9)
[(1  s) (p)  o   w]Y o   q
c
2
(Y c)2   q
o
2
(Y o)2 :
Combining (D5) and (D6), we have:
U 0 =
1
1 + 
V 0+1 =
H 0
2
: (D10)
Then (D7) together with (D10) yield,
c + w + qcY c = 4: (D11)
Also, (D8) and (D10) give,
o + w + qoY o = 4 (p) : (D12)
In steady state, we have A+1 = A: Substituting (7), (8), (9) and (C7) into (D9),
we get:
rA (1  s)DM (I) (3 + s)Y c (3 + s) (p)Do(p)+ q
c
2
(Y c)2+
qo
2
Do(p)2 = 0: (D13)
viii
Notice that (C6)-(C7) are identical to (D10)-(D12), so our equilibrium analysis for p,
Y c and s is the same as the one under the FSR. Thus, proposition 1 is valid under
both FSR and PSR.
Next, we write (D10) as:
U 0

(1 + s)

Y c +  (p)Do(p) DM (I)	 = H 0 [Y c +  (p)Do(p) +M ] =2;
which yields s = s(p): Direct dierentiation shows that
s0(p) =
1 + s  RT HU
M  X
 
1  "op
  
1  Do: (D14)
Consider Assumption 20, which is analogous to but stronger than Assumption 2.
Assumption 20: RT
H
U
  s > 1.
Then we can establish the results of Lemma 3, namely that under Assumptions 1 and
20, the trade subsidy in stationary equilibrium is negatively related to the relative price
of opium, whereas the producer-trader's assets in stationary equilibrium are positively
related to the opium price. The former result follows directly from equation (D14).
To obtain the latter, dierentiate (D13) to obtain exactly the same expression as in
the case of FSR, namely equation (C10).
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Chart 1: Pre-War Opium Shipments
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Chart 2: Post-War Opium Shipments
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Chart 3: Pre-War Real Trade Statistics
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Chart 4: Post-War Real Trade Statistics
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Chart 5: Pre-War British Net Export and Silver Outflows
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